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COMMENT
LIMITATIONS ON STATE POWER TO TAX
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT ON
INDIAN RESERVATIONS
William S. Dockins
I. INTRODUCTION
States and Indian tribes constantly compete for revenues from
taxable activities on Indian reservations. Nowhere is this struggle
more evident and more intense than in the energy-rich Western
states where both tribes and states are seeking to benefit from ex-
tensive mineral development on reservations. Estimates of the per-
centage of the nation's fossil fuels and other minerals lying on In-
dian trust lands vary," but there is no doubt that the reserves are
significant-more than sufficient to fuel a fight for revenues. Add
grazing, recreation, fisheries, agriculture, timber, and other re-
sources and the reservations become even more attractive targets
for taxing schemes. Complex issues surface during the process of
deciding which entity is entitled to receive tax revenues. This com-
ment will examine both state power to tax reservation resources
and limitations imposed on this power."
Most state taxation of reservation resources has been indirect.
Generally, state taxes are levied on the interests of non-Indian les-
sees, not on the tribe itself or individual reservation Indians.3 The
states' ability to justify only an indirect tax might appear to negate
any substantial state taxation. Restrictive federal leasing provi-
sions, however, have effectively fostered a potentially important
state role. Leasing is often the only mechanism provided by Con-
1. COUNCIL OF ENERGY RESOURCE TRIBES, OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, U.S. DEPr. OF
THE INTERIOR, THE CONTROL AND RECLAMATION OF SURFACE MINING ON INDIAN LANDS 7-1
(1979).
2. Issues concerning tribal power to levy taxes on resource development are not dis-
cussed. The Supreme Court recently held that the Jicarilla Apache Tribe has the inherent
power to impose a severance tax on mining activities undertaken by non-Indians on the
reservation. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S. Ct. 894 (1982).
3. The term "reservation Indians" includes only those Indians who are members of the
tribe occupying the reservation. In a recent case, the United States Supreme Court held that
non-member Indians and non-Indians have the same status on the reservation for state tax-
ation purposes. Washington v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 160 (1980).
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gress for developing reservation resources, and it has resulted in a
prevalence of non-Indian development. Inadequate capital, tech-
nology, and management skills have hampered tribal resource de-
velopment; often the tribes have been relegated to the status of
mere royalty collectors. Consequently, the role of state taxation on
the reservation has been significant because it reflects the interests
of the non-Indian developers.
However, the manner of developing natural resources on the
reservation is changing. Under self-determination policies, tribes
are expressing a will to remove the responsibility for reservation
resources from the federal government and place it under tribal
authority." Proposed legislation providing tribes with more latitude
in resource development decisions" and a recent United States Su-
preme Court case upholding tribal power to levy severance taxes
on non-Indian mineral lessees' supply impetus for increased tribal
participation in developing reservation resources. If this trend con-
tinues, states may find it increasingly difficult to justify their taxes.
However, non-Indians, especially energy corporations, are likely to
remain in the forefront of resource development, as lessees or in
other capacities. Their interests will continue to be objects of state
taxation schemes.
II. STATE POWER TO IMPOSE A TAX ON INDIAN-RELATED
ACTMTIES
Whether a state is empowered to tax Indians and Indian-re-
lated activities depends on an analysis of conflicting sovereign
rights. Congressional authorization to tax is an overriding factor in
determining if a state tax is valid. In the absence of this authoriza-
tion, important factors to consider include the nature of the taxa-
ble transaction, the legal status of the parties being taxed, and the
geographical locations of both the parties and the transactions.
4. See Note, Indian Coal Authorities: The Concept of Federal Preemption and Inde-
pendent Tribal Coal Development on the Northern Great Plains, 53 N.D. L. REv. 469, 484-
92 (1977).
5. Id. at 470-75.
6. Sen. John Melcher (D. Mont.) recently introduced a bill that would permit Indian
tribes to enter into a variety of agreements that may allow the tribes more flexibility in
mineral resource development than is presently possible under the 1938 Tribal Mineral
Leasing Act. S. 1894, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 14127 (1981).
7. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S. Ct. 894 (1982).
[Vol. 43218
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A. State Taxation with Congressional Authorization
1. A Qualified Congressional Authorization
A state tax is most easily validated if it is levied with express
congressional authorization. Congress holds plenary power over In-
dian affairs and may empower the state to levy a tax.'
An important caveat is that the state tax levied must strictly
adhere to the tax authorized by Congress. Kennerly v. District
Court" indicates that courts will narrowly construe authorizing
statutes. In Kennerly, the State of Montana asserted jurisdiction
over Blackfeet Tribe members on the basis of the Tribal Council's
consent jurisdiction. However, federal law provided that a state
could acquire jurisdiction only by "affirmative legislative action"
under Public Law 280,10 or, after 1968, by consent of the tribe as
manifested by a majority vote of enrolled members pursuant to the
Indian Civil Rights Act.' Because Montana's actions did not com-
port with the explicit requirements of either of these authorizing
statutes, the United States Supreme Court held that the state
lacked jurisdiction over tribal members. 12
2. Blackfeet Tribe v. Montana: A Missed Opportunity
The federal government has expressly authorized states to
levy taxes on reservation resources in certain instances. One exam-
ple is a 1924 Act,"' section 398, which provides that states may tax
the production of oil and gas on unallotted trust land. Relying on
this authorization, Montana imposes several taxes on non-Indian
oil and gas lessees.14 However, most or all of these taxes do not
8. The power of the federal government over Indian affairs is plenary. See Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56-58 (1978); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566-68
(1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1866); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
9. 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976).
11. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1326 (1976).
12. Kennerly, 400 U.S. at 427-29.
13. 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1976), referred to in text as section 398, provides that:
Unallotted land on Indian Reservations . . . may be leased . . . for oil and gas
mining purposes ... provided, that the production of oil and gas and other min-
erals on such lands may be taxed by the state in which said lands are located in all
respects the same as production on unrestricted lands, and the Secretary of Inte-
rior is authorized and directed to cause to be paid the tax so assessed against the
royalty interest on said lands: provided, however, that such tax shall not become a
lien or charge of any kind or character against the land or the property of the
Indian owner.
(emphasis added).
14. Taxes imposed by Montana using 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1976) as authorization include:
1982] 219
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adhere to the production tax expressly authorized by Congress.
In Blackfeet Tribe v. Montana," the Tribe challenged the va-
lidity of Montana's oil and gas conservation and severance taxes
and two other taxes on oil and gas interests held by non-Indian
lessees. The sole issue brought by the Tribe was whether section
398 was impliedly repealed by the 1938 Tribal Mineral Leasing
Act.16 The Tribe relied heavily on the opinion of a Department of
the Interior Solicitor which asserted that the 1938 Act was in-
tended to replace the earlier leasing statutes, not to complement or
incorporate them.1 7 The court, finding this opinion inconsistent
with several previous Department of the Interior opinions,1 8 re-
jected the Tribe's argument, held that section 398 had not been
repealed by implication, and granted summary judgment in favor
of the state.
The analysis of the issues in Blackfeet Tribe ended where it
should have begun. Unfortunately, the Tribe failed to allege that
Montana's taxes did not strictly adhere to those authorized by sec-
tion 398. Had this issue been raised, the court's determination that
section 398 is still valid would not have meant an automatic en-
dorsement of the state's taxes. Each of these taxes is subject to a
test to determine if it is authorized by Congress. As in Kennerly,
the state action-in this case a tax-must withstand a strict read-
ing of the authorizing federal statute.
The state taxes contested in Blackfeet Tribe do not stand up
to a strict reading of section 398. The statute authorizes a produc-
tion tax, but the state imposes, among other taxes, a conservation
tax and a severance tax. It seems unlikely that either of these taxes
strictly qualifies as a tax on the production of oil and gas. These
taxes, especially the severance tax, have regulatory purposes in ad-
dition to their functions as revenue-raising devices.19
A major inconsistency in Montana's taxes is that they are not
levied against the party contemplated by section 398. Section 398
expressly provides that the tax shall be "assessed against the roy-
alty interests on said lands." The royalty interest is held by the
(1) The Oil and Gas Conservation Tax, MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited
as MCA] § 82-11-131 (1981);
(2) The Resource Indemnity Trust Tax, MCA §§ 15-38-104 through -203 (1981);
(3) The Oil and Gas Severance Tax, MCA §§ 15-36-101 through -121 (1981);
(4) The Oil and Gas Net Proceeds Tax, MCA §§ 15-23-601 through -612 (1981).
15. 507 F. Supp. 447 (D. Mont. 1981).
16. 25 U.S.C. § 396a-g (1976).
17. Tax Status of the Production of Oil and Gas from Leases of the Fort Peck Tribal
Lands under the 1938 Mineral Leasing Act, 84 Interior Dec. 905 (1977).
18. 507 F. Supp. 446, 451 (D. Mont. 1981).
19. See Crow Tribe v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 1981).
1
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Indian lessor, yet the state imposes its taxes upon the non-Indian
lessee.2 0 The court in Blackfeet Tribe relied in part on British-
American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization,2 which
held that Montana's net proceeds and gross production taxes were
authorized by section 398. However, in British-American Oil, the
United States Supreme Court did not address the lessor-lessee dis-
tinction.2 These inconsistencies suggest the need for a close exam-
ination of section 398 to determine if it should be interpreted to
grant states power to tax non-Indian mineral lessees.2' Had the
Blackfeet Tribe court followed the preceding analysis, any state
tax levied on non-Indian oil and gas lessees that did not strictly
adhere to section 398 would be subject to court-imposed limita-
tions on state taxing powers that arise in the absence of congres-
sional authorization.2
4
B. State Taxation Without Congressional Authorization
In the absence of express congressional authorization, a state
may not directly tax reservation Indians or tribal property. This
20. The 1924 Act, 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1976), does not clearly state how the production
tax is to be assessed. A 1927 Act extended this same tax to executive order reservations. See
Act of March 3, 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-102, 44 Stat. 1347. The procedures for application of
the tax are more plainly outlined in the 1927 Act and indicate how the tax authorized by the
1924 Act is to be assessed:
Taxes may be levied and collected by the State or local authority upon improve-
ments, output of mines or oil and gas wells, or other rights, property, or assets of
any lessee upon lands with Executive order Indian reservations in the same man-
ner as such taxes are otherwise levied and collected, and such taxes may be levied
against the share obtained for the Indians as bonuses, rentals, and royalties, and
the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized and directed to cause such taxes
to be paid out of the tribal funds in the Treasury: Provided, That such taxes
shall not become a lien or charge of any kind against the land or other property of
such Indians.
25 U.S.C. § 398c (1976) (emphasis added).
21. 299 U.S. 159 (1936).
22. Comment, The Case for Exclusive Tribal Power to Tax Mineral Lessees of Indian
Lands, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 491, 515-20 (1973) (comprehensive discussion concerning validity
of British-American Oil; suggests that section 398 may not grant states power to tax reser-
vation lessees).
23. The validity of early federal leasing statutes, such as 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1976), is also
suspect because these statutes arose out of policies attendant on the allotment of Indian
lands. One intent of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976), was
to end allotment policies. The 1938 Tribal Mineral Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. § 396a-g, passed
subsequent to the Indian Reorganization Act, does not provide for state taxation and has
been held to preempt state taxation in certain instances. See Crow Tribe v. Montana, 650
F.2d 1104, 1111-13 (9th Cir. 1981).
24. If Montana's taxes had been held not to be authorized by Congress, the issues and
considerations that would have arisen would likely approximate those addessed in Crow
Tribe v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981). See infra notes 86-104 and accompanying
text.
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principle was enunciated as early as 1867 in The Kansas Indians
case,25 when the Court held that the property of Shawnee Indians
residing in Kansas was protected by treaties and laws of Congress,
and was immune from state taxation. The rationale for this deci-
sion was stated in an earlier case, Worcester v. Georgia.26 Chief
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, held that Indian nations
were "distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries
within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all
the land within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged,
but guaranteed by the United States. 2 7 Georgia's laws were held
to have no force within reservation boundaries and Georgia was
denied criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands. The principles
enunciated in Worcester have lost much of their conceptual sim-
plicity after repeated state attacks over the past 150 years. They
have been modified judicially and legislatively where essential tri-
bal relations were not involved.28 However, the policies underlying
these principles remain, and there is still no express authority for
direct state taxation of reservation Indians or tribal property.2 9
Such taxation is presumed to be preempted by federal law.30
In contrast, state taxation of non-Indian activities on the res-
ervations can proceed without express congressional authoriza-
tion, s provided that the tax is not preempted by federal law or
that the tax does not interfere with tribal self-government. Be-
cause non-Indian resource development is prevalent on reserva-
tions, these limitations on state power to tax non-Indian activities
assume considerable importance and require detailed discussion.
25. Blue Jacket v. Comm'rs of Johnson County, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866).
26. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
27. Id. at 557.
28. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
29. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973). Mescalero also illus-
trates the importance of the geographic component when considering the validity of a state
tax. Activities that have their sites outside the reservation may be susceptible to state taxa-
tion. In Mescalero a state tax was upheld on the gross receipts of a ski resort that was
operated by reseration Indians but located off the reservation.
30. Bryan v. Itasca C'ty, 426 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1976); Moe v. Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 475-81 (1976).
31. The United States Supreme Court validated state taxes directed at non-Indian
activities in several early cases. See, e.g., Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885) (rail-
way company susceptible to state property tax on privately owned right-of-way within reser-
vation boundaries); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898) (state property tax on cattle owned
by non-Indians who held grazing leases was upheld).
[Vol. 43
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III. MODERN LIMITATIONS ON STATE TAXATION OF NON-INDIAN
ACTIVITIES ON THE RESERVATION
A. Federal Preemption
Any state attempts to tax non-Indians on the reservation will
be subject to possible preemption by federal law. Federal power to
preempt attempted exercises of state jurisdiction arises from the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. 2 The federal
government derives its authority over Indian matters from consti-
tutional sources, from its guardian-ward relationship with tribes,
and-as a complement to federal guardianship-from the ultimate
federal ownership of Indian land.33 Federal preemption in Indian
affairs has evolved from unique historical origins, the most impor-
tant of which are the sovereignty considerations set out in Worces-
ter v. Georgia.34 Consequently, standards that have developed in
other lines of federal preemption cases are of little use or applica-
tion in Indian law.3 5
The modern approach to the use of preemption in Indian law
was articulated in Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Commis-
sion.36 Arizona had levied a gross proceeds tax on a retailer who
was federally licensed to transact business on the Navaho Indian
Reservation. The Court held that the state tax was barred by stat-
utes and regulations connected with the licensing scheme. The
Court further said that the tax could frustrate Congress' intent to
protect Indians from unfair or unreasonable prices, and that it
would impermissibly put financial burdens on the retailer or Indi-
ans with whom the retailer deals.3 7
State exercises of jurisdiction on the reservation are pre-
empted if they fall into either of two general categories. First, a
state action may not directly conflict with a federal enactment.3 8
Second, a state's actions are also barred if federal statutes, regula-
tions or treaties occupy the field leaving no room for state interfer-
32. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
33. Comment, The Indian Battle for Self-Determination, 58 CALw. L. REv. 445, 447-
51 (1970); see also McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (federal au-
thority over Indian matters derives from federal responsibility for regulating Indian com-
merce and for treaty making); Sherrick, State Jurisdiction over Indians as a Subject of
Federal Common Law: The Infringement-Preemption Test, 21 AIz. L. REv. 85, 89-97
(1979) (develops federal preemption doctrine in terms of congressional power).
34. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
35. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
36. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
37. Id. at 691.
38. E.g., Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
19821
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ence.3 ' The "occupying the field" category is conceptually more
difficult than the "conflicting law" category, because it is often dif-
ficult to determine at what point federal enactments permeate a
given area of law. It appears that the standard is broad since a
state may not interfere with the purpose or operation of a federal
statute, regulation, or policy.4
0
Several recent cases contesting the validity of various state ac-
tions on the reservation have been resolved by relying solely upon
federal preemption. This reliance reflects Congress' plenary power
over Indian matters.41 Preemption is applied on a case-by-case ba-
sis. Rather than looking mechanically at federal, tribal, or state
sovereignty, the courts make a particularized inquiry to see if the
state action violates a federal law.4 In most situations federal law
delineates the boundaries between state and federal jurisdiction.4 3
Where these boundaries are definite, there is no reason for a court
to look to"platonic notions ' 44 of inherent Indian sovereignty to re-
solve suits. Instead, Indian sovereignty is to be used as a "back-
drop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes
must be read. ' 45 It is more straightforward to resolve most cases
by reading and interpreting applicable federal enactments than it
is to decide each case by directly applying inherent sovereignty
concepts.
B. The Self-Government Test
1. Source of the Test
Essential to the application of the federal preemption doctrine
is the existence of federal enactments to define the boundaries be-
tween state and federal jurisdiction. In situations where the
boundaries are indistinct, the preemption analysis fails and more
complex concepts of inherent Indian sovereignty come to the fore-
ground to provide the basis for a second test-the self-government
test.
The test was articulated by the Supreme Court in Williams v.
Lee." The Court stated that "essentially, absent governing acts of
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action
39. E.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
40. Crow Tribe v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 1981).
41. See supra note 8.
42. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 149 (1980).
43. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
[Vol. 43
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infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them. ' 47 By its own language the test is sub-
ordinated to a federal preemption analysis. The courts look first to
applicable "governing acts of Congress," and only if they are ab-
sent does the self-government test apply.
48
Tribal power to exercise and maintain government functions
arises not as a result of federal enactments but from vestiges of
original tribal sovereignty.49 Even though the tribes are no longer
"possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty," 0 they are "a sepa-
rate people with the power of regulating their internal and social
relations. 851 Tribal powers are inherent powers of sovereignty that
have not been qualified or extinguished by congressional action. 2
Therefore, statutes and treaties of Congress should be viewed as a
recognition of pre-existing powers of self-government, rather than
as a source of these powers." In short, inherent sovereign powers
of tribes exist outside the sphere of sovereign federal powers and
do not necessarily require federal recognition.
Recent cases have affirmed the existance of tribal sovereignty
and self-government power. In United States v. Mazurie,54 the
Court held that Indian tribes were much more than "private, vol-
untary organizations" 5 and that they "possess a certain degree of
independent authority over matters that affect the internal and so-
cial relations of tribal life."56
However, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe57 seemed to be a de-
parture from previous concepts of the nature of tribal sovereignty.
The Court held that tribes could not exercise criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians because it was inconsistent with their dependent
status.5 8 This case marked the first time since early deci-
sions-where the tribes were held to have lost external aspects of
sovereignty-that status rather than provisions of a treaty or stat-
47. Id. at 220.
48. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 427 (1971).
49. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122-23 (U.N.M. ed. 1971); Pow-
ers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14 (1939).
50. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886).
51. Id.
52. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (U.N.M. ed. 1971).
53. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1895) (powers of local tribal government ex-
isted prior to the Constitution).
54. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
55. Id. at 557.
56. Id.
57. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
58. Id. at 208.
1982] 225
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ute were found to limit inherent sovereign powers.59 The Tribe,
therefore, was held to have been implicitly divested of criminal ju-
risdiction over non-Indians.60 United States v. Wheeler6 followed
closely on the heels of Oliphant. The Court reaffirmed tribal power
to exercise internal self-government among members, holding that
"Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not with-
drawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result
of their dependent status."62
After Oliphant and Wheeler it was uncertain whether tribes
retained civil jurisdiction over non-Indian activities on reserva-
tions. Subsequent cases have answered this question in the affirm-
ative. In Washington v. Colville Confederated Tribes," tribal pow-
ers to tax non-Indians engaging in economic activities on
reservations were acknowledged. The Court stated that tribes
could raise revenues from activities involving non-Indians if a
strong tribal interest for doing so could be shown. Thus, the Oli-
phant rationale was sharply limited to the area of tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.
In Montana v. United States" the Court approached an issue
of tribal regulation over non-members in an unusual manner.
Rather than directly holding, as it had in the past, that tribal juris-
diction over non-members exists in certain situations, the Court
stressed a general proposition that powers of tribal self-govern-
ment cannot be exercised over non-members. However, the Court
then recognized broad exceptions to this proposition. Distinguish-
ing Oliphant, it held that tribes "retain inherent sovereign power
to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on
their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands . . ." when non-
Indian "conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe." 5 Montana v. United States left no doubt that a tribe may
exercise powers of self-government over non-members who enter
59. E.g., Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 548, 574 (1823) (tribes lack power to
dispose of land at their will); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (tribes
do not have power to deal directly with foreign nations).
60. 435 U.S. 191, 195-206 (1978).
61. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
62. Id. at 323.
63. 447 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1980); see also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S. Ct.
894, 901 (1982) (Tribe's power to tax non-Indians doing business on the reservation "derives
from the tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its juris-
diction, and to defray the cost of providing governmental services .... ..
64. 450 U.S. 554 (1981).
65. Id. at 565-66.
226 [Vol. 43
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into consensual relationships with a tribe. 6 Therefore the consen-
sual relationship between tribes and non-Indian lessees, coupled
with a strong Indian interest, would appear to place non-Indian
resource development on reservations within the purview of tribal
self-government powers. 7 Any state attempts to tax these lessees
would be subject to the self-government test.
2. Application: Infringement versus Balancing
From its inception, the Williams self-government test has
been difficult to apply. The test lacks concrete standards, and as a
result, states have abused the test by attempting to employ it in a
manner different from that which was intended. States have ar-
gued that their jurisdiction is presumed and is not barred unless
tribes can prove that their self-government functions would be
impaired. 8
In McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission 9 the Court in
dicta explained how to apply the self-government test. The Court
made it clear that the test was to be employed only when non-
Indians were subjects of state action. It was to be used in situa-
tions where "both the tribe and the state could fairly claim an in-
terest in asserting their respective jurisdictions ... ",,70 and was
"to resolve this conflict by providing that the state could protect
its interest up to the point where tribal self-government would be
affected." 7' The Court interpreted the self-government test as an
infringement test. That is, tribes possess, as a retained sovereign
right, a certain field of self-government, and it is impermissible for
states to intrude into that field. Implicit in this view is that a state
would carry the burden of proving that its action did not infringe
upon tribal government.
The self-government test was interpreted differently in Wash-
ington v. Colville Confederated Tribes.72 There the Court used a
balancing approach that "seeks an accommodation between the in-
terests of the Tribes and the Federal Government on one hand,
and those of the State, on the other. '7 8 The infringement analysis
66. Id. at 565.
67. This statement assumes that tribes have provisions in their constitutions empow-
ering them to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians (non-members).
68. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Kennerly v.
District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
69. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
70. Id. at 179.
71. Id.
72. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
73. Id. at 156.
1982]
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that followed from McClanahan was ignored in favor of this judi-
cial balancing of the various interests asserted by the parties. Each
party shares in the burden of proof in the sense that it must assert
and prove its interests. The powers found in each entity will be
directly proportional to the valid interests asserted.
The balancing approach, unlike the infringement analysis, se-
verely compromises the self-government test. Unlike the more rig-
orous infringement approach, balancing does not imply a presump-
tion of inherent Indian sovereignty. In its application it does not
presuppose and establish a tribal right to self-govern before inter-
ests asserted by each entity are weighed. Rather, the balancing ap-
proach downgrades tribal government from an inherent sovereign
right to merely an interest of the tribe which is to be weighed like
any other when making a determination. For these reasons the in-
fringement analysis is more consistent with concepts of inherent
sovereignty and is a better guide than balancing for the application
of the self-government test.
C. Federal Preemption and Self-Government Tests as
Independent Barriers to State Jurisdiction
Some doubt has been cast by commentators upon the status of
the self-government test as an independent barrier to state juris-
dictions. It has been asserted that tribal government cannot of its
own force prohibit state jurisdiction, and that the self-government
test is a form of preemption analysis applicable only if tribal gov-
ernment is a federally protected right.7 4 In White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker,7" the Court treated federal preemption
and the self-government tests independently because "either
standing alone can be a sufficient basis for holding state law inap-
plicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal
members. '7' The Court noted that self-government and preemp-
tion are similar in that both depend on congressional action and
that preemption analysis proceeds in light of traditional notions of
self-government. 77 However, the reasons why the tests are indepen-
dent of one another were not clarified in Bracker. To be consistent
74. See Mettler, A Unified Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 89,
112-20 (1978) (argues that the Court employed a federal preemption analysis in Williams v.
Lee and that tribal self-government cannot of its own force prohibit state jurisdiction); see
also Note, Balancing the Interests in Taxations of Non-Indian Activities on Indian Lands,
64 IOWA L. REv. 1459 (1979).
75. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
76. Id. at 140.
77. Id.
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with Indian law principles, especially those protective of tribal sov-
ereignty, it is imperative that the tests be viewed as independent.
The bases underlying federal preemption and the self-government
test must be carefully distinguished.
A fundamental distinction between federal preemption and
the self-government test is that each draws on a different source of
power. Federal preemptive power arises from the United States
Constitution while tribal self-government can ultimately be traced
to retained inherent sovereign powers. The failure to treat the self-
government test as an independent barrier to state jurisdiction re-
sults when tribal sovereign powers are ignored and self-government
is viewed solely as a creature of federal law. Unquestionably, tribal
government is a right that is retained by permission of Congress .7
In that sense, tribal sovereign rights are subject to federal sover-
eign powers. However, this does not preclude tribal sovereign
power from operating independently of the federal government
with respect to interactions with a state.7
Confusion may arise when federal power reinforces the con-
cept of self-government, consequently masking a tribe's inherent
power. This occurs when tribal government is encouraged by fed-
eral policy 0 and as such takes on preemptive federal power. How-
ever, federal enactments resulting from this policy should be
treated as a recognition of, but not a source of, inherent sovereign
power. 1 When such federal policies are present, tribal and federal
powers co-exist, giving tribal government a dualistic power struc-
ture. It is easy, and erroneous, to view tribal governments as
backed by federal power and to forget that their ultimate source is
inherent tribal power that is sufficient in itself to defeat many
state intrusions onto reservations.
The status of federal preemption and self-government tests as
independent barriers is supported by other considerations. The
two tests are used in different situations. Preemption, for example,
is employed when regulations and statutes define the boundaries
between state and federal jurisdiction. Even though federal enact-
ments govern in almost all cases, 2 there are areas where the
boundaries are indistinct. Where the provisions of treaties and
78. See supra note 8.
79. Washington v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980): "[T]ribal
sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the
States."
S0. See, e.g., Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (Wheeler-Howard Act), 25 U.S.C. §§
461-479 (1976).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
82. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
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statutes are not clear, application of preemption analysis would be
little better than guesswork. The self-government test, therefore, is
implemented in these instances to protect tribal interests. In other
words, even if it is unclear from federal statutes or treaties whether
a state action is permissible, it is a certainty that this action may
not interfere with tribal government. Again, the self-government
test is often ignored because the prevalence of federal enactments
enables preemption to be used in most situations, while the self-
government test need only be employed infrequently.
Federal preemption and the self-government test may also
have different legal consequences. Preemption necessarily results
in complete divestiture of a state's power to act in the preempted
area of law. In contrast, the self-government test may result in a
compromise. In McClanahan the court stated that the "state could
protect its interest up to the point where tribal self-government
would be affected."8 Using this infringement approach,84 the legal
consequences would be similar to those of preemption: state power
to act would be divested once it intruded into the "field" of tribal
government. However, the balancing approach 85 seeks an accom-
modation of federal, tribal and state interests. The entities'
power-tribe or state-would depend entirely upon the validity of
the interests asserted, resulting in a judicially determined
compromise.
D. The "Substantial Connection" Test: Crow Tribe v. Montana
The foregoing discussion indicates that any state action on a
reservation is subject to the tribal self-government test if the ac-
tion has not been authorized by Congress or if it is not preempted
by federal law. Both the balancing and the infringement ap-
proaches to employing the test provide a means of analysis. Before
either can be applied, however, the extent of tribal interests and
powers must be established. Crow Tribe v. Montana86 provides
some guidelines for determining the scope of tribal government in
the natural resource area.
The facts in Crow Tribe resemble those in the Blackfeet Tribe
case examined earlier.8 7 The Tribe sued to enjoin Montana from
imposing its severance tax on coal mined by non-Indians on the
reservation, as well as from coal deposits held in trust for the
83. Id. at 179.
84. See supra text accompanying note 71.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
86. 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981).
87. See supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text.
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Tribes located off the reservation. The suit was dismissed in the
district court for failure to state a claim for relief. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to
the district court where, at the time of this writing, it awaits fur-
ther disposition. Even though the case is not yet resolved, the
Ninth Circuit opinion implies that the state tax may be held
invalid.
Applying a preemption analysis, the court held that if the
Tribe's allegations are true, the severance tax would thwart poli-
cies of the Tribal Mineral Leasing Act of 1938.8 The magnitude of
the tax could prevent the Tribe from receiving substantial eco-
nomic benefits from its coal resource.' Nevertheless, the court rec-
ognized that an economic impact on the Tribe could be justified by
legitimate state interests in imposing the tax. However, these in-
terests do not include appropriation of Indian mineral wealth
under the guise of state concerns to conserve and to benefit from
nonrenewable resources."
The court also addressed the Tribe's assertions that the state
severance tax infringed on tribal self-government. Instead of using
the infringement approach outlined in McClanahan v. Arizona
Tax Commission,"1 the Crow Tribe court followed Washington v.
Colville Confederated Tribes" and interpreted the self-govern-
ment test "to require the reviewing court to balance the impor-
tance of state interest in asserting the particular authority against
the impact on the Tribe's ability to govern itself effectively.' 8
The Tribe advanced two economic arguments to support their
contention that the state tax infringed on its government. It
claimed that the tax impaired its ability to levy its own severance'
tax and that the Tribe was deprived of bargaining power when ne-
gotiating with lessees for royalties. The court consolidated these
arguments into the single issue of whether the state could permis-
sibly deprive the Tribe of potential revenues from the development
of its mineral resources. Relying on language from Colville Confed-
erated Tribes, the court implied that the Tribe's interest in the tax
revenues was stronger than the state's, because the revenues could
ultimately be traced to mineral resources which are a component
of the reservation land." In contrast, the Supreme Court in Col-
88. Crow Tribe, 650 F.2d at 1111-12; 25 U.S.C. § 396a-g (1976).
89. Crow Tribe, 650 F.2d at 1113.
90. Id. at 1114.
91. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
92. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
93. 650 F.2d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 1981).
94. Id. at 1116-17.
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ville Confederated Tribes held that revenue gained from the on-
reservation sale of cigarettes to non-Indians lacked a "substantial
connection"" to Indian land, and therefore a state tax on these
revenues was upheld.
The distinction between activities that do or do not have a
substantial connection to the land could play a significant role in
future resource taxation cases, especially when the tax is not pre-
empted by federal law and the case turns on a determination of
the limits on powers of tribal government. The courts appear ready
to recognize that incidental economic impact, imposed on a tribe
when a state taxes a non-Indian lessee, may interfere with tribal
government functions.6 In certain cases the courts may ignore the
legal incidence of the tax and concentrate on the economic burden
placed upon the tribe. However, it appears that these economic
hardship arguments may have force only when the taxed activity
has a substantial connection to Indian land.
Future decisions must determine which activities possess this
substantial connection. The connection most likely exists in re-
source-related activities. For example, the court in Crow Tribe rec-
ognized that mineral resources are a. component of reservation
land. This is consistent with United States v. Shoshone Tribe,9 in
which the Court held that minerals and standing timber are con-
stituents of the land."8 Somewhere between cigarette sales and
natural resource development a line must be drawn setting apart
those activities that have a substantial connection to Indian land
from those that do not.
Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of River-
"side" illustrates how difficult it may be to make this distinction. In
this case, allottees of land held in trust sued to enjoin the county
95. 447 U.S. 134, 156 (1980).
96. Compare the apparent readiness of courts to accept arguments concerning indirect
economic impact incident to state taxation of non-Indian lessees with the fate of similar
arguments in cases brought under the federal instrumentality doctrine. In several early
cases the Court extended this doctrine to the non-Indian lessee and even to the lease itself.
Incidental economic impact on tribes was found sufficient to bar the state tax. See, e.g.,
Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922); Choctaw & G. R.R. v. Harrison, 235 U.S. 292
(1914). These cases were later overruled and tax exemptions were refused to those holding
government leases unless the effects upon government functions were direct and substantial.
Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949). See also Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County
of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972) (court refused
to find that non-Indian lessees of allotted land, or lease itself were federal instrumentalities;
indirect economic impact arguments were held untenable).
97. 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
98. Id. at 116.
99. 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972).
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from imposing a possessory interest tax. The lands were leased to
non-Indian lessees. Only the cash value of the lessees' interest was
taxed. Even though the lessees' activity was integrally connected to
Indian land, the court held that indirect economic effects upon the
Tribe, such as removal of a better bargaining position, did not in-
validate the tax.
A few years later, the same issue reappeared in Fort Mojave
Tribe v. County of San Bernadino.10 a The Tribe's reservation en-
compassed portions of three states. One state, California, levied a
possessory interest tax on non-Indian lessees of reservation land
within that state. The leases between the Tribe and the non-In-
dian lessees were long-term and contemplated significant develop-
ment of the land. A resort, housing project, and possibly a nuclear
plant were to be built. The Tribe argued that the tax would slow
development in one portion of the reservation and that it inter-
fered with the Tribe's power to levy its own possessory interest
tax. The court rejected both arguments because the effect of the
state tax would be indirect and would only result from an inability
to market a tax exemption. Because the taxes were imposed by dif-
ferent taxing authorities, double taxation would not result. '
The holdings in Fort Mojave Tribe, Agua Caliente Band of
Mission Indians, and Crow Tribe, when read together, suggest that
a substantial connection to Indian land exists only when the activ-
ity involves an actual component or constituent of the land itself,
such as timber or minerals. Activities requiring severance of a com-
ponent, with a consequential decrease in the value of the land, may
be immune from state taxation because incidental economic bur-
dens of the tax deleteriously and impermissibly interfere with tri-
bal government. However, if land development by non-Indians re-
sults in an increase in the value of Indian land, it may be possible
for the state to tax the non-Indian lessee's interest regardless of
the incidental economic consequences to the tribe.
Therefore, absent preemption by federal law, it appears that a
state may tax any non-Indian interests on the reservation unless
the taxable activity involves an actual component of Indian land. '02
The tax, however, must be carefully tailored to reflect legitimate
state interests.10' Powers inherent in tribal self-government will
100. 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
101. Id. at 1258-59.
102. These non-Indian interests may also be subject to a tribal tax. The existence of a
state tax does not prohibit the tribes from taxing the same activity. All that is being said
here is that in certain situations the tribal government lacks power to oust state taxing
jurisdiction. See supra note 2.
103. Washington v. Colville Confederate Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 163 (1980).
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defeat indirect attempts"0 by the state to tax an actual component
of the land when the tax is not congressionally authorized.
IV. CONCLUSION
The validity of a state tax imposed on a non-Indian activity on
the reservation depends upon the result of a relatively complex
analysis of conflicting sovereign rights. If a state tax is based on
congressional authorization, its provisions must strictly comply
with the federal authorizing statute. In the absence of this authori-
zation, the tax is valid only if it is not preempted by federal law or
if it does not impair tribal government. The courts have ap-
proached the self-government test in two ways-a judicial balanc-
ing of interests and a strict infringement test. The latter is more
consistent with fundamental Indian law principles.
The federal preemption and tribal self-government tests stand
as independent barriers to the exercise of state jurisdiction. Fed-
eral preemptive power has a constitutional source while tribal gov-
ernment derives its power from inherent tribal sovereignty. Inher-
ent tribal power, although retained by congressional permission, is
sufficient to preclude certain state actions on the reservation.
The cases to date suggest that, unless preempted by federal
law, a state may tax any non-Indian interest on the reservation
that does not have a substantial connection to Indian lands. It ap-
pears that this substantial connection exists when an activity in-
volves an actual component of the land. When this connection is
present, a tribe may validly assert that economic harm incident to
the taxation of the non-Indian interest impermissibly interferes
;with tribal government.
Most natural resource development on the reservation neces-
sarily has a substantial connection to Indian land. Absent congres-
sional authorization, it is unlikely that a state can justify taxation
of resource development by non-Indian lessees that results in sev-
ering a component from the land.
104. The state lacks power to directly tax a component of Indian land. See supra text
accompanying notes 24-29.
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